Phil,

Great post. I agree wholeheartedly with what you are saying. The Army is really heading towards a "dark winter" on the officer personnel side if it doesn't do something soon. Not only do we have to worry about LTC Nagl's "pied piper" effect on contemporaries and subordinates, but we are seeing an exodus of talented young officers (1LTs and CPTs) with the same intellectual potential heading towards the exit doors as soon as their Active Duty Service Obligation ends. While this has been reported extensively on the USMA front, we are also seeing an exodus of talented civilians who enlisted for OCS upon completion of their 3 year ADSO.

If there's one thing that OEF and OIF have shown us, it's that officers are not fungible - at least in the presently constructed AVF. Sadly, this lesson is not taking hold in the higher levels of Army leadership. Right now the RA sits at 54% strength for BQ/KD CPTs and almost 100% selection rates to MAJ. The USAR is in even worse shape. As our "best and brightest" exit, we are promoting and placing very questionable people in key leadership and staff positions.

Even worse, on the "intake" side of the officer piepeline, we are increasingly stealing from our NCO Corps to create 2LTs, instead of casting a wider net for them in the civilian world. Just yesterday on www.armyocs.com, I met the acquaintance of an Army MSG with 14 years of service who just got selected for OCS. She joins the dozens of SFCs and MSGs who've been selected in recent months under the accelerated OCS application program. Taking our future CSMs to produce an officer that will maybe stay in the Army to make Major is not a fair exchange.

This is one story to watch.

M. Belgrano,

I agree entirely with your premise. Maybe not Secretary of the Army, but certainly a key position. He's aligning himself with all the "right" people (e.g. CNAS) for that to happen.

"The Army is poorer for his loss. Nagl is one of this country's leading soldier-scholars. He was a likely candidate for general's stars and high command, because he had a rare combination of brilliant intellect and operational excellence as a commander."

Well, this is how I choose to see it...Army's lost to our nation's gain...perhaps he can now bring some scholarly sanity to the politico's who infest DC, and just a touch to that five sided building as well.

T.E. Lawrence got out as a light colonel too. Just don't follow his example, Dr. Nagl. Don't go buyin' any motorcycles or riding without a helmet or doing anything else that might cut short your fine contributions to the nation.

After re-reading my post it seems to come off a little snarky. I thought through several factors that could've contributed to his desire to leave and realized I'll never fully understand his motivations, either way. Is this just a case of better opportunity with a different quality of life? Or a more visible example of something (talented officers leaving the Army) we've touched on here several times? Probably a lot of both.
Shorter me: Strike that last post.

For laymen, one also might suggest that the joint that allowed LTC Nagl the opportunity to shine, the Combat Studies Institute, is considered one of our "think tanks," even if it is stuck in Leavenworth and not near K Street. He also has lectured at USMA and the US Army Soldier Heritage Center and Military History Institute at Carlisle (another unlikely place to put a "think tank," but there it is).

For those who also don't know much about LTC Nagl, he was attached as a staffer to OSD's deputy secretary of defense for policy (at the time, Wolfowitz).

One might suggest that this is the sort of perch whereat one can make some difference in how policymakers view ongoing operations, especially when this is the advice you're giving to those who will listen.

Inside baseball, but Petraeus wasn't the only very senior officer who "protected" Nagl (and others), but he was instrumental in putting many of the "no men" who could deploy onto his MNF-I staff in Baghdad for the so-called "Surge."

JD might know his left hand man pretty well. He recently departed to become a professor at Ohio State.

I don't want to speak for LTC Nagl, but he's been married a relatively short time and has a son who was born only a month after 9/11. In other words, he's spent the bulk of his son's life deployed or working insanely long hours doing important, stressful things.

He's probably staring at another battalion deployment to OIF or OEF as a commander.

He's earned the right to walk away. He's a smart, decent man who is well known not only for his smarts but his competence as a field commander. He's been in the US Army (first as a cadet) since the Reagan Administration (he's my age).

I don't want to speak for him, but just remember that 24 years is a long time in uniform, even for those at the rank LTC or COL (which is where he'll end up), even for those who got breaks to complete post-graduate study and labor in DC or the Pentagon.

A great portion of military service, even for officers and senior NCOs, is blue collar. It's why we toughen ourselves up for living outdoors, exerting physically in ways our old bones and sinews probably aren't supposed to be stressed.

It gets old.

I suspect Nagl is pretty well burned out by now and may just be unable to face being on the Iraqi treadmill for the next ten years or so. I also wonder if the failure of another brilliant officer, McMaster, to be selected for promotion to general officer rank has something to do with it. When reading Phil's report and his concern that other talented younger officers may leave as well, it's hard not to think of our friend IRR's many posts about the quality of leadership provided by the Schoomakers, Caseys, et al.

And then I think of Pete Dawkins. A legend at West Point. First Captain, the last Heisman trophy winner for Army, and Rhodes Scholar. Another PhD, too. From his first day of active duty, the golden boy Dawkins was viewed as destined to be CSA one day. Dawkins did not disappoint on active duty. He was a well-respected, fine officer, rising to the rank of brigadier general. Then he just up and quit, retired as a one-star. He'd done well in an unpopular war, played a significant role in rebuilding the Army into an all volunteer force and was then working on the DCSOPS staff in a choice billet. Yet he left.

At the time, there was a lot of speculation that maybe what Dawkins had seen of the Army's leadership had something to do with his decision to leave early. So far as I know, Dawkins never really talked about it, so we're left to guess. But I do know that had he stayed, there's a good chance that names such as Powell or Schwartzkopf might not have ever been in the headlines.

So who knows? Maybe these really bright folks leave for reasons unrelated to national security policies or Army leadership. But it's pretty clear to me that the current course of the nation can't be doing a whole lot for the Army's chances of retaining its best people, those who will be most needed in the rebuilding effort. But then, IOTM that the Contemptliber may choose to ship over, especially if some of the best competition takes off. What do you say, Contemptliber?

The Army is really heading towards a "dark winter" on the officer personnel side if it doesn't do something soon.

I know a kid ( sophomore ) at our local public high school who wants to go to West Point.

Is this a good time to get in, any advice for the young fellow, IRR, or anybody?

..

Basil:

I teach up at USMA, and I'd tell the young man - absolutely, but come in with your eyes wide open and understand what you're signing up for.
My personal belief is that the Army is on the cusp of serious change, potentially on the order of what we did after Vietnam. Part of it will be out of sheer necessity, given how we're currently burning through equipment and people; part of it, I suspect, will be due to some national conversations about what our military is for that come out of this election cycle (and yes, I can already hear IRR and CL chortling in the background - call me an optimist).
So tell that young man - come on in, but be ready for major changes.

After some forty years around and in the military, man and boy, much of it involved with Vietnam and aftermath, I always thought Halberstam's linkage of "The Best and The Brightest" to be less than accurately descriptive, more than faintly elitist, overstatement. While there are always a few people in any profession who are the best AND the brightest, I wonder if the military officer corps can include many of these. Seems more likely that many of the best officers aren't, and don't consider themselves, the brightest, while some of the brightest conclude from their military service that they can best serve their country, or themselves, in mufti. My observation, in the twilight of my own career, late 80's, was that, at the upper levels, the best served as commanders and leaders, while the brightest served best as top staff officers. The institution survives them all, and in the Long War, the Nagls and McMasters in later career will be honored for their service and contributions to the solutions, as they were in their uniformed days. Certainly one of the most refreshing and hopeful signs I've seen in recent times has been the Nagl generation replacing the senior officers of my generation as media commentators and OpEd stalwarts, as Nagl demonstrated on NPR this afternoon.

Yes, promotions are something near and dear to my family since my wife is currently a Major and will get a first look at LTC next year. My wife does not wear a bag, so that raises the bar somewhat by itself, but assignment choice is also critical. We've spent many a night debating on whether to take an assignment that would provide a needed "check-in-the-box" or one that is better for other reasons. With two tours left we are currently deciding what to do. My wife was also an assignment officer for her career field for a time and saw many officers making these same kinds of decisions. In many cases, an assignment decision made at the Captain level will pretty much guarantee that officer will never achieve Colonel and even make LTC a challenge. For reasons of family or whatever, many officers choose to torpedo their promotion chances, but they usually do this knowing the consequences.

There's also a lot of scuttlebutt surrounding the promotion boards in the AF. Once the promotion list comes out, people immediately start looking at the careers of those who were promoted to see if there is a pattern that the current board is looking for. What we've anecdotally discovered is that those on promotion boards tend to promote officers with career tracks similar to their own which has obvious negative implications. Other factors include the writing skills of those writing evaluations and the current assignment one has when a promotion board meets. Ideally, one wants performance to be the top factor, but that's not always the case, unfortunately. I'm fairly confident my wife will make LTC but the chances of anything beyond that are slim at best and that's ok with us.

Mark:

Your point on the volumes in the library is well taken, although I'd argue that the UC comparison is unfair - you're talking about a system versus a single school.

As far as the larger question you pose, I honestly believe it's apples and oranges. One major strength of our academic system here is that it's all small group and seminar work - no classes over 18 people, so lots of interaction with the instructor. No massive lecture courses with 150 of your closest friends. Lots of opportunities for work with outside agencies and travel, including the opportunity to study abroad for a semester. Other civilian universities also have these programs - what it really boils down to is, do you want that immersive experience or more of a conventional college experience? It's very much an individual choice.

One reality is that you've got far more control over your branch selection at USMA vs. ROTC. Even if you're a DMG, you're still scrapping for your branch choice, whereas, if you're in the top 1/3rd of your USMA class, you've pretty much got your choice. That may be unfair, but that's the way it is, and it's unlikely to change in the near future.

One reality is that you've got far more control over your branch selection at USMA vs. ROTC.

My wife got a full-ride USAF ROTC scholarship, but the proviso was that the AF choose her degree. It was a limitation she accepted and ultimately turned out to be a benefit.

Contemptliber (can I call you Joe?): Nate Fick is still associated with CNAS, for whom he's working on a report about Afghanistan. He's also here, finishing a joint degree at HBS and the Kennedy School.

Actually, you can call me "MSR."

Your point on the volumes in the library is well taken, although I'd argue that the UC comparison is unfair - you're talking about a system versus a single school.

UCLA has over 8,000,000 volumes. Berkeley has over 10,000,000. The system as a whole, 35. Pick your poison.

Armen,

UCLA and Berkeley are comprehensive universities with numerous graduate schools ... not to mention ENORMOUS student bodies.

USMA is a 4,000 student undergraduate-only institution.

A better comparison of their library holdings would be with places like: Amherst, Wesleyan, Lafayette, Colgate etc. - similarly sized, undregraduate only institution.

Ray,

One reality is that you've got far more control over your branch selection at USMA vs. ROTC.

While that may be true, IMHO, it's not worth the 5 year ADSO. Today that 5 year ADSO = at least 3 tours in Iraq with the 3rd (or 4th) likely keeping you in service on stop loss.

As an ROTC grad and moderator at www.armyocs.com, I've come to the conclusion that the OCS "college op" process for civilian college grads is the best game in town. 3 year ADSO and you get either $65,000 in loan repayment or the GI Bill. I was ROTC non-scholarship (3 year ADSO but served 4) and got the GI Bill. That baby gave me a Law Degree and an MPH after the Army .... a better deal than any ROTC scholarship.

IRR likely would say that wars in OEF and OIF should preclude any person from volunteering. I would argue that the entire reason for our existence is to deter conflict or to prosecute war.

Don't put words in my mouth. What I'm simply saying is that before you've spent even a day in the Army, why would anyone, given this OPTEMPO, commit to 5 years of ADSO for the same commission that could only require 3? Big deal you get a bachelors degree for free while forfeiting your independence, GI Bill and student loan repayment. You know, some folks just don't like the Army and those last 2 years (or more w/ stop loss) could be excruciating and/or deadly.

I don't know why you would divert a college bound kid who is USMA material into enlisting for a hot war as an E-1 to "test drive" the Army? That sounds pretty asinine to me. 1999? Not so much. Today? Insane.

90 credits (the minimum needed to apply to OCS in-service) is not esay to come by with this OPTEMPO.

I would argue that the entire reason for our existence is to deter conflict or to prosecute war.

While this may be true, the converse is that an endless 15 month deployment cycle with 12 months rest/retrain/refit is too much to ask of a miniscule AVF in a war that demands nothing from most of the country. Throw in the 4-6 years that these kids may have to spend in the IRR waiting to be recalled, and you're asking an awful lot. If I could take a time machine back to my old unit, 2 BCT of the 10th Mountain circa. 2001, I would be committed to a rubber room if I forecast today's OPTEMPO, mass IRR Recall and retention standards.

The Army is a "big machine" with a lot of ways to serve and it may shock you, but most kids (college bound or not) aren't too amped up about endless tours in Iraq. This reality which our senior leaders deny is a big part of why we've had to lower our enlistment standards, IET training and retention standards simultaneously.

Now that the economy is tanking and recruiting is still a struggle, will our senior leaders finally acknowledge that the problem is IRAQ and not the supposedly "robust economy" that keeps kids from enlisting?

Well blow me, I suddenly realised that I've met the guy. He was doing his doctorate at St Antony's College, Oxford, at exactly the same time as me, and attended one of the same classes (Prof O'Neill's seminar on military history). Small world. I imagine that he'll do a fine job wherever he is, and is probably right that he can be as useful in as out.

Paul

Sorry, that should have been 'out as in'.

Paul

I was thinking about the ArNG, too, Jimmy. Because of the new deal for them, they basically do a tour and then are off for a long time. Our Reservists certainly don't have that kind of program.

Another option he could consider is "Active First." It's kind of new, but it allows a recruited Soldier to do a term in the Regulars first for 2 1/2 - 4 years, and then rotate over to his state's ArNG.

The bonus for this is large, and she or he can sock it away and then use it later in college, along with the state's ArNG tuition program.

I don't know why you would divert a college bound kid who is USMA material into enlisting for a hot war as an E-1 to "test drive" the Army? That sounds pretty asinine to me. 1999? Not so much. Today? Insane.

I'll tell you why: Any kid with the balls and the brains to go to USMA probably has the stuff to be enlisted first. I think we too often sell short the unique experience of being enlisted first.

That said, Ray also is right: the age cut-off at 21, assuming he joined at 18, could be difficult because his deployment status is more important (and should be) to the Army than his potential placement with the Plebes.

Upon saying that, and perhaps Ray would join me here, I couldn't imagine a better gift to USMA's cadets than a young man or woman who has served some time in uniform, perhaps even in combat.

We often make the point that giving a DECENT GI Bill to our troopers benefits our colleges and, later, our society perhaps as much as it does the young Soldier. Well, this is true for our Academies, too.

For all the diversity we've worked so hard to achieve at the Academies, one thing I believe is still missing for the Cadets, Midshipmen, et al, is the enlisted experience within the ranks.

This is a fuzzy notion, one I haven't explored, but one I think might have some merit.

Some of the best exchanges in ROTC programs nationwide today occur between the ArNG kid who has lost two years while he's been deployed for train-up and then combat and the broomstick-up-his-ass Cadet SSG who hasn't gone anywhere or done anything.

As you might notice, I didn't earn my undergraduate degree either through USMA or ROTC.

The think tank he is going to is full of Clinton folks - Nagl is betting that Senator Clinton will win.

If not, he's just going to be writing op-eds for the NYT.

I couldn't imagine a better gift to USMA's cadets than a young man or woman who has served some time in uniform, perhaps even in combat.

Concur - to a limited extent. As IRR pointed out earlier, every promising young PFC/SPC that we pull to be a cadet is one less potential senior NCO. As much as I'd love to double the number of combat vet cadets at USMA (20 out of 1311 in the most recent class), the pragmatist in me has to admit that they're probably needed more in the field.

I do like the way our combat vet cadets "push" the others in terms of military training and development - just as I like the way the high school honors society folks "push" in the classroom and elevate the level of discussion and learning. Balance, balance in all things.

Back to the topic of this thread, what would I change about the current academy experience to better create more original thinkers like Nagl? I'd force everyone to live abroad for a month in an non-English speaking, non-Western country. Not go to school, not bunk in with a host family - drop in with a week's worth of warning to bone up on the culture and a little bit of language. I give you just enough money to get a place to live and not starve for the first week - after that, it's up to you to find employment and get by.

Ahh, to be king (or Supe) for a day...

'Is that the same O'Neill that wrote a biography on General Giap??'

Yes, that's the guy. Here's his Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_J._O'Neill

'I'd force everyone to live abroad for a month in an non-English speaking, non-Western country.'

Good idea. I've heard it mentioned before, and always thought it sound, though the bit about dumping them without means of support seems rather hard!!

Paul

I'd force everyone to live abroad for a month in an non-English speaking, non-Western country.

From a more practical standpoint, Ray, we have people who are trying to work out a way to just get ROTC cadets to take junior year abroad (not my project).

The problem is that the traditional year away for undergrads conflicts with either military training requirements OR with the university-bound military science staff.

Some are wondering why we can't do some duplication with "joint" ROTC efforts at campuses overseas -- obviously, there are some major cultural problems involved here.

My unsolicited (but hearty) recommendation was that it would be better for the Army if the junior-level ROTC cadets didn't take ROTC that year and instead immersed themselves abroad in another culture.

It was determined by unanimous non-secret (and loud) consensus that I was still closet al-Qaeda, as far as they were concerned.

You can bring my proposal to USMA's CTC and see if it gets a better response there.

Kimball:" Back to the topic of this thread, what would I change about the current academy experience to better create more original thinkers like Nagl? I'd force everyone to live abroad for a month in an non-English speaking, non-Western country. Not go to school, not bunk in with a host family - drop in with a week's worth of warning to bone up on the culture and a little bit of language. I give you just enough money to get a place to live and not starve for the first week - after that, it's up to you to find employment and get by."

why doesnt this happen?

This is an interesting twist on survival training.

Traditionally, survival training is oriented toward SF &light infantry units (&pilots), because everyone else are presumed to be living within the log train support. Therefore, survival training focused on wilderness survival. Urban survival, or survival among the people, is a topic reserved for SMUs and the IC.

For everybody else, wilderness land navigation and the "MRE Class" suffice as "Survival" training.

However, now that we are moving into War Amongst People paradigm, perhaps we need to refocus our training effort on urban survival. Incidentally, urban survival involves a lot of cultural training, where we get a lot of synergy.

Certainly urban survival would be a great addition to Ranger School :) Just imagine the hungry hordes of ranger students descending upon trash cans like Freegans in New York City!

Jimmy nailed it - I was absolutely thinking along the lines of the model of the SAS survival programs, where they get "lost" in some godforsaken terrain and forced to survive and navigate their way out of it.

MSR - nope, not joking. Dead serious. USMA cadets can attend for two years before they incur any kind of commitment. I'd sequence them out into this program during the second semester of sophomore year and summer before their junior year. If they succeed, they get to continue on and become part of the profession of arms. If they don't, or they have to hit the panic button and go to the local embassy -- well, thanks for your time, go finish your education elsewhere.

Fnord, the main reason it doesn't happen right now is much of the program inflexibility that MSR identifies with the ROTC program. We, too, have our sacred cows that must not be slain. Oh yeah, and the paralyzing fear of a) getting sued and b) hostile media coverage.

For a true test of survival and character you could release the prospective cadets in southeast D.C.
Thats as scary a place I've ever been to even if the natives do speak english.

For a true test of survival and character you could release the prospective cadets in southeast D.C.
Thats as scary a place I've ever been to even if the natives do speak english

I resent that remark. I live in Southeast. So does LTC Bob Bateman a few blocks away.

Wow. This article is like a summary of the last six months of this blog. A money quote:

Suddenly, he veered into a scathing critique of his commanders' preoccupation with institutional process. "Rather than focus on important stuff, they focus on PowerPoint slides. They'd have me up all night to make one slide a little prettier," he said. "After a while, you start to think, What am I doing over here?"

As one forced to employ powerpoint daily, I sympathize completely.

Sorry, another quote, it's a long article, a must-read:

When seasoned junior officers read that President Bush is negotiating a long-term occupation of Iraq, and that the Democratic presidential candidates are acquiescing to the notion of 50,000 or 100,000 troops being stationed there for five to ten years, they can foresee the future. They know that their Army life won't be like that of their parents' generation, when a foreign posting meant Germany in the 1970s, touring the Black Forest in a BMW with the kids. Rather, it means daily danger and the complexities of diffusing a civil war. The family will be back home in a remote place like Fayetteville, North Carolina, wondering if Dad or Mom is going to return alive.

I've tried to explain that before, Andrew. There really is a divide within the officer corps over what to make of the OGs and COLs.

The perception amongst those of us from the Desert Storm/Somalia generation, say from McMaster to Nagl, is that we paid some serious dues early on, learned from our brush with combat, and then developed a way of seeing the world that was expeditionary, that asserted the necessity of SUL control and that was predicated on results, not appearances.

Yingling's essay actually just inserted into the public domain a bitter internal dispute that had been roiling us from 2004 - 2006, especially those of us who, by then, had completed two tours in OIF.

That's something I think IRR -- who also is from our generation -- kind of misses when he defends CSA Casey. For our generation in OIF, Casey and Sanchez represented something very bad about Army leadership, perhaps the same way that Vietnam vets look at GEN Westmoreland.

I've been waiting for PA NCO to show up and mention that LTCs like Nagl, et al, at 22-24 years TIS aren't the "young offices" the headlines say they are! At 41 and with nearly 20 years in, I'm what a junior enlisted should call me, a "f*cking old lifer."

For a group of us -- and I would count CPT Carter in that -- we became the so-called "no men." Increasingly, we saw that the prosecution of the war in Iraq was wasteful, stupid, counter-productive and, most important, pointless if tangible results couldn't be shown to the American people. This was made worse by the frankly insulting rosy scenarios spun up by CMNF-I and OSD during those years and the fact that the top didn't care to listen to the bottom, especially those of us closest to the ground with the MTT, INF, et al (if you notice, I'm fighting a retrograde battle to keep MTT and not the stupid MiTT that's being tossed around like another pointless analogy to sports).

But the tension comes from careerism. There are LTCs who value promotion over what I would call "reality." They have NOT sided with the CPTs and the MAJs and the LTs who have owned OIF, but rather with the COLs and above who see the potential for advancement and have remained silent.

What drove me to this blog in particular after I got back from OIF was burning rage. CPT Carter was the only one articulating just how angry an entire generation of leaders was about how the war was planned and prosecuted from 2002 to 2006.

Now, I know that I've since backtracked, largely because I fully endorsed the so-called "Surge" tactics, even if I didn't believe they would ultimately be successful (and now would concede that I was unduly pessimistic), and championed the staff that was sent to Baghdad to change things.

But I'd rather be wrong than lose this war, and I think there are still some things to salvage of vital national importance in Iraq. That, and I give a damn about the Iraqis.

I should add that no reporter has fully explored an equally compelling and similar internal discussion within the ranks of the enlisted. There is a growing generational gap between the "lifers" who were senior NCOs before the war and a far, far larger bloc of combat-tested junior NCOs.

For those of the Desert Storm generation, this gap between them and the new guys isn't so large. But for all those CSMs who never deployed anywhere and didn't get that ol' CIB until they were in their 40s, there's some bitterness when they parrot the crap from the generals.

It's far more subtle, but it's there.

"I'd rather be wrong than lose this war, and I think there are still some things to salvage of vital national importance in Iraq. That, and I give a damn about the Iraqis."

Well in that case, you ought to be able to state what the frigging objectives are MSR. This idiot war was lost from the start -- there was never anything to be won.

Tell you what, Ray. I want to be there on the day you haul the PowerPoints into the office of USMA Commandant BG Bob Caslen to inform him about the unique new training program you've developed.

Maybe on Branch Night, you will be on hand to distribute "Survivalman" MOS slots to those particularly adept at dining out of dustbins and skinning house cats for protein and clothing.

I see SOME merit to what you're suggesting (and might suggest that we spend a great deal of money at mantracker, desert/jungle survival, SERE, Ranger, et al, every year stripping away the polish of civilization to instill self-confidence and teamwork).

But I'm not sure a bureaucracy would be adept at institutionalizing a lack of depending on that institution for everything from child care to soap.

I also would be interested to see how many cadets would even come back. If I could go overseas, find a house, girlfriend, job and decent paycheck, maybe I wouldn't want to go back to the dream of someday being a LT.

MSR,

I think you misstate my reasons for giving GEN Casey the benefit of the doubt. While you decry him, what other serving 4 star would you propose installing as CSA instead? That's my point - he was the best of a constellation of middling options.

GEN Casey inherited a mess left behind by GEN Schoomaker - certainly the worst CSA I've seen in my 13 years of Army service (starting w/ GEN Sullivan).

I've been impressed with GEN Casey's candor and his willingness to at least publicly acknowledge that our force is "out of balance." I found nothing objectionable in his talk at Brookings on 12/4.

That said, I am distressed with Casey's unwillingness to reform some of Schoomaker's small-minded hucksterism.

Is GEN Casey "God's gift to the Army?" No. Is is the best we can hope for given the current slate of 4 stars? Yes. GEN Petraeus can only do one job at a time. It is my fervent hope that he will rise to be CSA in 2011 and coalesce today's instiutionally adrift US Army.

18A course used to include a block where they are blindfolded and dropped out of a van alone w/o money in a US urban environment with instructions for a linkup a few days later...

on another note I picked up my orders last week, getting out at 12 years. I know a CA and AV major who are doing the same thing. wonder how much of a trend it is, holding steady or increasing or what?

I was joking with you, Ray. Don't be so prickly.

I'm sure no one is monitoring this thread anymore, but there was an interesting story today in the Kansas City paper, in re Leavenworth, Mixon and the COIN Manual.

“It’s a myth that all of a sudden we published the manual, then all of a sudden we got counterinsurgency,” Mixon told a handful of officers from Leavenworth’s counterinsurgency center.

Urban warfare studies at Fort Polk, La., for years have underscored the importance of winning the support of civilians in an occupied country through negotiation, he said. The military has long urged understanding local culture and improving people’s living conditions.

I've never served under Mixon, so if anyone has done some time in the north, please comment. I'd like to think that some parts of the north have regressed over the past year or so, unlike Anbar and Baghdad.

That said, I think he's also right. There most certainly were COIN experiments (led mostly by COL McMaster at Tal Afar, the joint USA/USMC Anbar COP efforts w/ the MTTs, and Chiarelli's earlier tasking in Baghdad), but the systematic, readable work that came out of Leavenworth was groundbreaking.