The Assassin's Gate
[Phillip Carter,
Wednesday April 26, 2006 at 4:18am ]
My copy of The Assassin's Gate by George Packer arrived shortly after I deployed to Iraq. One of my journalist colleagues said in an e-mail that this book could be "the one" — the single, authoritative narrative of how America marched to war in Iraq. I found that statement to be a bit odd. We are certainly at war in Iraq, but we have not finished it yet. I couldn't imagine a definitive narrative of Iraq that could be written with the war still in progress, and the outcome still very much in doubt. Nonetheless, after reading Packer's Pulitzer-finalist book, I have to agree that it is the best-written of the Iraq tomes currently on the market, although it's still too early in the war to tell whether this will be "the one". With the same brilliant writing style characteristic of his New Yorker pieces, Packer tells the story of how American went to war in Iraq. He spends a large amount of time on the Iraqi exiles who informed so much of this endeavor at the outset, possibly dooming it in the process, and a lot of time as well on the flawed planning processes at State, Defense, the NSC and the White House.
Packer also spends much time in the field, traveling the length and width of Iraq to add an element of realism and ground truth to his book that makes it so much more interesting than I expected. (Full disclosure: my adviser team hosted Packer in Iraq earlier this year, during his reporting trip for this New Yorker piece on Tal Afar and counterinsurgency.) Through his colorfully constructed and well-told stories, I really came to understand such problems as the ethnic division of Kirkuk, the impact of Saddam's totalitarian regime on the psyche of Iraq, and the struggles of American army officers in 2003 as they transitioned from warfighting to peacemaking in a matter of days.
Now, nearly six months after finishing his book, three major points remain with me:
1. Contradictory Evidence. There is enough evidence on the ground in Iraq to support any conclusion you want to arrive at, save for the absolutes. It is not absolutely certain that we will win or lose here — only that the outcome will be something greater than defeat, something less than total victory. Packer arrives at this observation near the end of the book, and I think it's absolutely brilliant. When members of Congress and the press come to Iraq for "touch and go" visits, I imagine they find whatever evidence they want to support the opinions they had when they landed here. Likewise, the reporters and soldiers like me who live here for months on end are able to piece together just about any conclusion we want, depending on the day and our morale, because there is plenty of evidence out there for us to pick from. It's extremely hard in Iraq to arrive at any definitive, objective, balanced version of "the ground truth." The truth in Iraq always remains just out of focus, beyond the ability of our eyes and minds to resolve into clarity. Perhaps this is why Packer himself remains so studiously ambiguous on the war's outcome, despite his support for the war in 2002 and 2003.
2. The Iraqi Psyche. Saddam's regime had a very clear effect on the Iraqi people. Packer compares this to the psychological trauma he observed in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. I think that's an appropriate comparison. The Iraqi people clearly became accustomed to an ordered, structured, disciplined police state where individual thought, activity, dissent and initiative were discouraged. The psychology of Saddam's state affected every institution in Iraq, including those I work most closely with: the police, courts, jails and legal profession. Even today, three years after the fall of the Hussein regime, Iraqi officers and officials continue to behave in the same old patterns. It remains difficult to get an Iraqi officer to take the initiative, or to trust in his fellow public servants, or to take risks. There was a large group of policymakers, academics and pundits in 2002 and 2003 who thought you could immediately graft a functioning civil society and liberal democracy onto Iraq once you had removed Saddam. I'm finding the practical work of building that society to be much more difficult, largely for the reasons that Packer writes about in his book.
3. America's Endeavor. Early in the war, Packer embedded with an infantry company commanded by then-CPT John Prior, an infantry company commander with the 1st Armored Division in south Baghdad. The chapter on CPT Prior takes you for a grunt's tour of Iraq, complete with tense moments, hilarious moments, and boring moments. This section from Packer's Nov. 2003 article on the unit is illustrative:
Charlie Company spent a month establishing security in the area near the zoo and setting up a neighborhood council. Then, in late June, the company was moved again—to the military academy in south Baghdad—because its zone of control did not coincide with Baghdad’s administrative districts. "We’d made friends there," Prior recalled. Packing up again, he said, "was not that cool." He added dryly, "We'd been planning this war since freaking 12 September, and it might have helped if someone had drawn a map before the war and figured out where everyone went."The story of CPT Prior's company illustrates so much about the war that was true in 2003, and remains true today. Clint Eastwood said it best as Gunnery Sergeant Tom Highway in the movie "Heartbreak Ridge": when face a new or unfamiliar problem, you improvise, you adapt, you overcome. CPT Prior had no experience as a sewage engineer or city manager before deploying to Iraq; he commanded infantrymen, warriors trained to close with and destroy the enemy by means of fire and maneuver. And yet, they did a good job in their new role as peacemakers and nation-builders — a testament to the capabilities and flexibility of the U.S. military at the brigade level and below. However, we continue to face many of the same challenges as CPT Prior's company. We continue to deploy units configured, equipped and trained for conventional operations. We are still learning lessons and developing TTPs that should have been learned and developed long ago. And many of the flawed reconstruction decisions, such as the policy of pursuing large Hoover Dam-scale projects instead of smaller micro projects, have yet to be fully reversed or revisited.
According to the brigade's original calendar, Baghdad's infrastructure would be rebuilt in August, elections would take place in September, and the soldiers would leave the city in October. This brisk forecast was soon abandoned, of course. Because of confused planning, it wasn’t until August that Charlie Company’s activities began to yield tangible benefits for Iraqis. And there was no time to lose. Throughout the summer, electric power operated sporadically, violence of all kinds kept rising, and Iraqis who could have been won over to the American side were steadily lost.
One morning, I sat in the base-camp canteen with Prior, First Sergeant Lahan, and their translator, Numan Al-Nima, a gray-haired former engineer with Iraqi Airways. Prior opened a coalition map of Baghdad’s security zones and showed me the piece of the city he "owns": a rectangle of Zafaraniya, a largely Shiite slum in south Baghdad. Roughly two hundred and fifty thousand people live in the area. Prior chairs the new neighborhood council and is in charge of small reconstruction projects such as renovating schools; he’s also responsible for sewage and trash disposal in his battalion’s zone, which contains half a million people.
"Infrastructure is the key now," Prior said more than once. "If these people have electricity, water, food, the basics of life, they’re less likely to attack." Sewage, Prior realized, was the front line of nation-building. When I met him, in early August, Prior was trying to get two hundred thousand dollars into the hands of Iraqi contractors as fast as he could.
"Show us something," the translator urged Prior. "People are hungry, starving. They don’t believe they got rid of Saddam. If they got rid of Saddam, give me something to eat. That’s why people hate Americans. We don’t hate them because they are Americans. It is because they are the superpower, but where is the super power?"
Packer ends his book on an optimistic note, possibly because he finished it sometime in early 2005, just after the successful Jan. 2005 election. His April 2006 article on Tal Afar was decidedly more pessimistic. The Assassin's Gate does a brilliant job of explaining the past and present in Iraq, but the future remains quite unclear. Maybe that's due to Packer's insight about contradictory and ambiguous evidence. The situation in Iraq remains dynamic and complex enough to go in either direction, depending on the course of events in the next several months. Insha'allah, we will succeed.
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Great review Phil. And sad.
3 years in, we clearly don't have peace in Iraq, the figures
for infrastructure (electricity, clean water etc) are below
Saddam-era levels, and the political system has failed to
produce a new government 4 months after the elections.
Now, I wouldn't want to blame this on the troops, but if the
overall results are as dismal as this then it's hard to say
that anyone has "done a good job". Many people have tried hard; many others have screwed up. But the whole point
is that the "job" has *not* been done.
Anyway, good to hear from you.
The U.S. went to war with Germany in December 1941. Four years later we crossed the Rhine with an entirely new operational specialty - Military Government - composed of thousands of officers trained to do just what this poor company commander has been OJTing to do. We deployed dozens of "Constabulary" units specially trained to do civilian and civil-military law enforcement. We had briefing books availiable on the entire spectrum of German organizations, political entities, parties, even individuals, etcetera, etcetera...
In four years. All of this done while fighting a global war against two major industrial powers.
So here we are, having been fighting Saddam off and on since August 1990, doing nothing much more than watching American Idol and wondering where all the missing white girls went to, and 13 years later we wandered into his capital with no freaking idea where the administrative boundaries were?
This is just clueless.
I'm not going to insist that this sort of ass-backwards planning ensures "defeat", but when you say that given the level of incompetence being displayed by the geopolitical planners all the way from 1600 Pennsylvania Ave to the Five-Sided Skinnerbox on the Potomac, to think that we might still pull off "something less than "total victory" seems wildly optimistic.
It's like we're trying to prove Sun Tzu's point that a general who knows neither himself nor his enemy will win a hundred battles and still find himself beaten.
JD, suggestion for a thread:
Will the staff changes in the Administration have any direct effect on it's policies in Iraq, and will there be a change in how the US handles the Iranian nuclear issue besides the steel gauntlet in the silk-glove method.
As an example. If we really did need 450,000 troops to occupy Iraq, where were they going to come from? We are sruggling to maintain a much smaller force. I understand that the theory is that we would have created stability quickly and we could have reduced our force by now. But I don't see how it is realistic to think the political differences between Iraqi's were going to get sorted out more quickly than they have.
There are a number of lessons that could be taken from this experience but I think it is a mistake to put too much faith in the "what ifs". For instance, one possible answer to the question of "what if" is that if we hadn't invaded Iraq we would now be preparing to make a much larger mistake with Iran.
I think the most serious question, that is not being seriously asked, is whether use of military force is even a signficant factor in fighting the war on terror. It seems that the instability we have created in Iraq has helped our enemies, at least in the near term. In Afghanistan it clearly disrupted the Al Qaeda group in that country. But it is not clear that put a serious dent in the ability of terrorists to attack us. They have mobilized quite effectively in Iraq. While that may be a unique circumstance, the bombings in Egypt and Jordan would indicate that it might not be either.
The fact is creating stable, semi-popular governments that create opportunities for their citizens may be far more important than any military action aimed at creating stability or preventing terrorist bases. We need to figure out what carrots and sticks will make that happen. Military action is probably part of the stick, but it may be a very small part.
They were not "deployed," the entire organization was built from scratch and became officially operational on 1JUL46 (V-E Day was 8MAY45). The Constabulary Force was responsible for patrolling 40,000 sq miles (Iraq is ~268,533 sq miles) and 1,400 sq miles of international borders (Iraq has ~2268 miles). The Constabulary Force was composed of 32,000 Soldiers. So, crunching some numbers, Iraq is close to 7 times the size of the zone patrolled by the Constabulary, so you would need ~224,000 troops in Iraq at all times (Right now, there are ~138,000.). Interestingly, that number is closer to GEN Shinseki's estimate of "several hundred thousand."
That all being said, there are some lessons learned that should have been carried over into OIF, in particular that bit about organizing close to old Iraqi administrative districts like was done in Germany along
"the major divisions of the German civil administration."
Additionally, the Trooper's Handbook they had put together would be good reading if you can find a copy somewhere. Still also, the curriculm of the Constabulary School would provide a good reference for creating a unit level program to train leaders and Soldiers to do SASO stuff. At the same time, many of the technical skills mentioned in the article that were taught at the School such as "theory and practice of criminal investigation, police records, self-defense, and the apprehension of wanted persons" can be taught using the MP Soldier Training Publication and reinforced by coordinating with Military and civilian police.
How does GEN Abizaid, the current commander of CENTCOM, fit the bill?
From Wikipedia: "Abizaid was born in the United States to a Christian Lebanese-American family, is fully fluent in Arabic, and is the most senior military officer of direct Arab descent. He was raised mostly by his widowed father. His nickname at West Point was “The Mad Arab.”[1] He started a program to put Arabic speakers on a fast track for promotions...In his civilian studies, he earned a Master of Arts degree in Area Studies at Harvard University, and was an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Jordan in Amman, Jordan."
I'd argue he is one the best choices the Army has for his current post. Also, I remember reading good things about what LTG Petraeus was able to accomplish in Iraq when he was in commmand of the 101st there.
That all being said, the SASO stuff succeeds or fails based on the abilities of Leaders from Fire Team to Company Commander, maybe as high as Battalion Commander. Leaders in those levels, in addition to being the best at what they do militarily (Rifleman, Cav Scout, Tanker, Combat Engineer...), must also be familar with the cultural and social environment they will operate in, knowledge about certain nuances of the culture, and must be able to understand the needs and desires of the average Iraqi and be able to communicate with them to better understand and help them achieve those desires.
In general, I think the Army is getting there. I can only offer personal ancedotes, no statistics to back that belief up. It based on my observation that the overwhelming majority of noncommissioned officers, especially SGTs and SSGs, and company grade officers (Field grade officers to a lesser extent, although there are a large number of them) I work with have deployed to OIF or OEF. Their experiences are an invaluable resource in teaching new Soldiers and Leaders (Such as myself). That knowledge, both combat tactical and SASO, is an invaluable intangible that is forgotten when people argue that OIF is breaking the Army.
From Wikipedia:
"JCS 1067 was a basis for US Occupation policy until July 1947, and like the Morgenthau Plan, was intended to reduce German living standards. The production of oil, rubber, merchant ships, and aircraft were prohibited. Occupation forces were not to assist with economic development apart from the agricultural sector."
...
"On March 20, 1945 President Roosevelt was warned that the JCS 1067 was not workable, it would let the Germans "stew in their own juice". Roosevelts response was "Let them have soup kitchens! Let their economy sink!". Asked if he wanted the German people to starve he replied; "Why not?".[2]
On May 10, 1945 Truman signed the JCS 1067."
It's a job best handled by those with some life experience, and unfortunately, most 18-20 yr olds don't have enough. I suspect that the US NG and Reserve units have actually performed better at SASO in Iraq than regular infantry units (taking nothing away in terms of effort or desire to do well), precisely because most of them are older and have some life experience which enables them to better empathize and work with locals. Also, it is a great asset if your infantry company has individuals who in their civilian lives work as cooks, postmen, engineers, police, town administrators etc. etc. - it's much easier to do what one poster said, to improvise.
In terms of having time to prepare for this, many if not most of the lessons should have been learnt in the Balkans during the 90s. The Army in particular was, however, very resistant to it. This is understandable considering the tasking to 'fight and win the nations wars...' but I hope that this time around what is being learnt will be retained...Iraq is not the last place to need nation-state building.
Finally, I usually find Phillip Carter's posting very informative, this time was no exception but I'm curious: Was it just a slip that the two 'bookends' in terms of what the outcome can be are 'defeat' and 'total victory' (in Packer's terms but agreed to by Phillip)? Even in a military environment those are less than useful terms, and certainly there could never be 'defeat' or 'total victory' in state-nation building, it's a process that is ongoing (nearly 100 years for my country and over 200 for the US) - speaking in absolute terms, even as 'bookends', seems an illusion to me. Thanks for the illuminating debate on the site.
He talked about speaking to officers and troopers about his experiences chasing VC and NVA and his distilled wisdom about techniques and tactics was news to almost all of them, even though they were all either going to be or had been chasing muj around Iraq at the time.
The Packer book doesn't expose any shocking truths. Most of what he says was known about Iraq back in April 2003. It's just that the Army has tried to fight the war it wanted, not the war it has, and to a great extent appears to be still trying after three years.
And I would agree that a huge part of the reason is that a) the gentleman in the big chair at the War Department is no Harry Stimson and b) none of our current JCS has been George Marshall.
I know from personal experience that the guys and gals wearing three-color deserts right now are terrific people, and will move mountains to accomplish the mission. That's meaningless if the mission is HUA from the get-go because of poor planning. There have been a pile of terrific soldiers throughout history that have been thrown onto the pyres - at Dieppe, at Kursk, at Dien Bien Phu, at Hamburger Hill - because they were asked to do something that was tactically, strategically or geopolitically moronic.
The folks driving this bus don't seem to remember shit, and they don't show signs of learning shit as they go along. So it's great that the snuffies (and company- and battalion-grade officer snuffies) are adapting and overcoming. But when do we see the Iraq soup become the soup sandwich? Cause my sense is that the clock is running...
I was in Germany as a dependent in 1955 ehen the occupation ended and the joke that was going around the US militrary communities was what was the first thing the Germans were going to do when the occupation ended?
It was take the clorine out of their water because it ruined the taste of their beer.
I do not know if the story was true, but what it did was show how massive the US envolment in Germany during the occupation was and how it took into consideration so many thing that no one was think about for Iran. The story illustrated how completely inadequate our plans for Iraq were compared to Germand and Japan.
Jon --the Morgenthau Plan was the original idea,ut as soon b
Jon --the Morgenthau Plan was the original idea,but as soon as the Cold War emerged it was discarded as unrealistic.
Also, are you quoting data for all of Germany, just West Germany or just the American occupation zone-- a little over a third of West Germany?
"The territory to be patrolled has an area of over 40,000 square miles and included nearly 1,400 miles of international and interzonal boundaries, extending from Austria in the South to the British Zone in the North, and from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone in the East to the Rhine River and the French Zone in the West."
If anyone is interested, the US Constabulary Trooper's Handbook (1946) was actually extremely easy to find online thanks to the US Army War College and Google.
Of course, you never have enough time to do the battle handover.
What is winning? The establishment of secular, pro-West constitional democracy with strong civil rights protections for religious and ethnic minorities and women is one measure. Others?
What is losing? Civil war is one measure. The US being forced to retreat out of the country is, presumably, another. But civil war in the Balkans and in Lebanon (the two most applicable analogies, as best I can tell) took a while to take off after the earlier totalitarian regimes collapsed. How long must an Iraqi government stave off civil war before we declare victory? How quick a collapse constitutes losing?
Assume, just for grins, that we see a period of ethnic cleansing over the next year, accelerating as US troops are drawn down or cease patrolling. Assume that the Shia establish a de facto state in the south by signing oil contracts with iran and establishing a sharia-based legal system. Assume that the Kurds establish a de facto state in the north by establishing their own legal system and signing their own oil contracts with Syria. Assume that death squads operating in the center of the country suppress the sunnis from wielding cohesive political power.
Success? Failure? Worth the expenditure of US blood and treasure?
There was once an Army breed known as "old Asia hands." Hackworth was one of them. A fellow named John Paul Vann was one. Lots of far less eminent guys were too, predominantly in special forces and military intelligence. I was even sort of one, although not to the extent that many others were. Concurrently, the Army had old European hands. What the old hands brought to the table were language skills—initially acquired in my case as a young guy—but then acquisition of cultural skills, etc., acquired because the language ordinarily dictated assignments actually dealing with the locals. It was expected that these guys would spend repetitive tours in those areas. And it was not unusual to find these guys going back for different languages, almost always in the same theater. A guy who had Japanese, for example, would often get Korean, Chinese, etc. A guy with Russian would get German, Polish, etc. The objective was to build an expert in a particular part of the world. The State Department and other agencies did the same thing. With two languages, one Asian and one European, I was an anomaly, something I didn't realize until late in my career when a search of all linguists who also had the requisite intelligence operational skill for something in Europe that required an Asian language came up with one guy: me. It's important to understand that the "old hands" were not the "listening" breed of linguists. The majority of people sent through language school are those who end listening and interpreting, not speaking. Those who can actually interface with foreigners are rare.
The Army never had "old Middle East hands." We never had troops there and with the exception of WW2, we never fought a war there. And, during the days of the Cold War, we never expected to do so. I can only recall one guy out of my 25 years in the system who could really comfortably operate there. He was American born—and that's a requirement for my old line of work (no naturalized citizens)—of Lebanese descent and had spent a great deal of time traveling back and forth (usually on personal stuff).
The point of my war stories is this: I opposed the Iraqi adventure because I knew what we were going to get into once serious hostilities ended. I also knew that, although we have hands-down, the finest troops on the planet, that wouldn't be good enough unless the objective was to place a total stranglehold on every aspect of Iraqi life. And if that was the case, then I knew we had too few troops, by a factor of maybe five or six. Paradoxically, I think the job could be done with the current troops at hand, if they were the right troops and if they had the right leadership. I was struck by Charly's input regarding NG and reserve troops. That makes sense. Older dudes are just what's needed.
Phil Carter has made a very good post here. I've not read Packer's book, but I did read his New Yorker article. I won't read the book because I figure it's OBE.
Everybody posting here gets it. Those who've given us that valuable information about the German occupation know that there's something awry in Iraq. No one's brought Japan up, but it's the same thing. What's striking is the amount of planning and preparation that went into those efforts. By all agencies of the U.S. Government. Not to mention sheer brainpower and will. I don't see this in Iraq. I read about MacArthur grappling with the role of the Emperor and the cultural impact of his actions. I read about Lucious Clay. I hoped Jay Garner, an officer whom I knew years ago and always respected might be able to come close. At least I figure Garner might have read "The Pillars of Wisdom."
In addition to the overall challenges associated with a military occupation, our forces are also dealing with a major insurrection, something that wasn't associated with docile Japan and Germany. Here the CRS syndrome strikes with force. The book's been written. What'd they do with it?
The Army emphasizes "situational awareness." IOTM this might apply to more than a tactical commander's issues. Just how much situation awareness has the Army demonstrated WRT the Middle East? We had a war there in 1991. CENTCOM really became a major player after that. I'm a little curious as to what what our military planners were doing from 1991 to 2003.
Incidentally, for anyone who wants a decent read to go along with T.E. Lawrence, try Bruce Feiler's "Abraham, A Journey to the Heart of Three Faiths."
Oh, if that were true. Sadly, it's the exact opposite.
The mere fact that NG units are involved in kinetic operations is proof positive that the planning for this went somewhat aglee.
To put it mildly.
I'm constrained by writ of law from saying anything specific, but let me give you some highly illustrative examples of how our civilian/military brain trust might be fighting this war. None of these events will mention a specific unit, place, time or give otherwise identifiable signs of having taken place:
1. Let's say there's a group of 11Bs training at, oh, how about Camp Dixie. The instructor at the grenade pit -- you know, the guy WITHOUT the combat patch on his shoulder -- tells the man who has ACTUALLY THROWN A GRENADE IN COMBAT that he's doing it all wrong. You see, he was "skipping" the grenade into the target rather than slowly lobbing it like a rainbow at the cardboard cutout.
The man WITHOUT the combat patch explained that the dirt in Iraq is as soft as a sandtrap, and the grenade won't clatter through the MOUT environment of alleyways, concrete and stone, but, instead, gently tuck itself into the fine desert grains and explode harmlessly in a hushed whimper.
The combat veteran then shows the instructor that he can stand rigidly at the foot of a sand pit, face his body toward a machine gun nest, and hurl a rainbow trajectory of grenades at the "enemy."
Other brilliant training evolutions involve looking for "IEDs" the size of brooms stapled to stop signs, engaging targets 1,500m away with an M-16A2 and cajoling from the town police the release of drunken staff NCOs before they deployed to Iraq.
2. When the veteran from a previous deployment to Iraq begins talking, in Arabic, to a detainee (a former Sgt in the Baathist Army, perhaps), he is yelled at by an enlisted NCO of higher rank. He is not allowed to speak in Arabic to the detainee, or anyone else in Iraq. Only the Lieutenant, through a bemused interpreter, is allowed to talk to civilians on patrol.
How, the combat veteran asks, are you supposed to tell people what to do when you're at a checkpoint?
You just point your gun at them and curse them out and they get the message, he said. A lot of pointing with a muzzle and cursing is involved.
The other soldiers nod, agreeing that this is the best way to communicate with women, children and old men in Iraq.
Later, the combat veteran is ridiculed for offenses ranging from handing out pencils to school children in exchange for tactical information to knowing how to tell the IAs SITREPS when they enter American battlespace.
In fact, he's considered odd for even talking to IAs.
It's later determined that speaking in Arabic is not only strange, but slightly effeminate. These same men nevertheless later ask the combat veteran to buy bayonets and falafel from Iraqi soldiers and shopkeepers.
That's considered OK. Don't speak Arabic to the terrified mother with a gun pointed at her gut, but haggle with the fat man over the feloos needed for a sandwich.
3. Combat Veteran volunteers for IA missions during offtime. When a LT and a gunner are wounded, and the driver killed, during an ambush in town, the veteran renders aid, evacuating them from the kill zone. He assaults the origin of fire and becomes the pointman in house clearing along a block of homes, eventually netting one of the shooters, who provides information to interrogators.
Combat veteran is counseled by an NCO who was kicked out of the active duty military for drunkeness. Combat Veteran is barred from similar future missions because going out with the IA is "too dangerous" and, frankly, "weird."
Combat veteran is nominated for high decoration by the Army, forcing formerly drunken NCO to lose his top and scream for days. Low ranking NCOs don't deserve such high awards, he pouts. Only E-7s and above should have such medals, and that's why the quotas exist! Damn it!
4. Combat Veteran goes on a patrol as an attachment with another platoon. CV is there when the platoon and a group of IAs capture a driver speeding by with a car full of (stuff). CV arrives to find IAs beating the man to death with their helmets. The American LT on the scene is laughing and VIDEOTAPING the event.
The man is saved and taken to the FOB, alive, by lower ranking men.
5. Many, many months into their deployment, a group of three soldiers is manning a gate onto the FOB. It's seven minutes before curfew ends and they see a car turning onto the MSR from about 400m away.
The radio crackles: "We're engaging a car because he's violating curfew!" Bang! Bang! Bang! Bang!
Four shots. Is he alive? Dead? Wounded? What about the car?
"We don't know. We think he got away."
Drunken, fat, stupid NCO at HQ falsifies the official notification to higher echelons to make it seem as if the three soldiers followed proper ROE and escalation of force, even though the driver showed no hostile actions. He was simply driving. Wrong place, wrong time.
Perhaps his watch was fast. Perhaps he lives in a country without electricity and his clock stopped. Perhaps he just got confused and turned the wrong way on the MSR.
The unit's XO not only fails to send anyone to see if the driver survived, but agrees that it was proper to shoot up the car because, "How else are these people going to learn about curfew?"
Higher command never learns that the unit wasn't even trained on proper ROE and that they routinely engage people for far less terrifying reasons than simply driving on the MSR seven minutes before curfew ends.
Official documents are falsified so that it appeared the man was something of a terrorist, neglecting a "flare" that was fired at him and repeated "warning shots" from distances the vehicle could not possibly have navigated without violating every law of physics. They do this in case he actually is dead or wounded and his family will come seeking some recompense or, even worse, mention this to the Iraqi press.
This was done, fat, stupid senior NCO says, not "because of Joe, but because of all the leaders of Joe who could get in trouble."
Combat Veteran refuses to falsify the log and tells the senior NCO that what he's doing is wrong.
No one cares what Combat Veteran thinks. He's ordered that it's illegal for him to discuss this, or any other allegation of violations of the rules of war. He's ordered to be quiet about it and is made to sign a paper holding him to that promise.
6. Combat Veteran asks to speak to the IG about these issues. Combat Veteran is interrogated by his Chain of Command before the IG arrives. Combat Veteran is mysteriously placed on a detail at the last second so that when the IG shows up, he is forced to miss his scheduled appointment.
He now must communicate with the IG by email, knowing that his command believes it's "illegal" and, more importantly, "disloyal" to discuss any of these issues with them.
I could go on and on and on.
I was very proud of my participation in the invasion of Iraq. Until I deployed with this unit, I was never ashamed to be a warrior.
Now, I'm ashamed to even be an American. And I never thought I would ever say that.
It's a bit annoying to see so many in here blame Rumsfeld or Bush or Halliburton for what went wrong in Iraq. Trust me, we could all take an informative trip down the chain of command to see a great many travesties that, in toto, comprise the macrocosm of this Arabian picaresque.
The larger question, to me, is what has this war done to our formerly competent, professional and beloved military? Now that Iraq has broken it, is this what we own?
Not all units, and not all leaders, are good units or good leaders. I have seen units that were incompetent and at the same time arrogant. I have seen leaders that couldn't lead water downhill. I served under a commander while in the OPFOR (a great unit) that was so screwed up his soldiers kept "CO count-down calendars" that ticked off the days until his command ended. He was so rude that Mother Teresa would tell him to go get Fu*&^%$. His soldiers hated him, and he hated them right back. He sucked.
But that does not mean that it was the norm - it was in fact far from normal. The "average" unit that I served in was amazingly good. The "average" leader in the units I served with was thoughtful, motivated, and eager to learn.
Sounds like you are in an NG unit that sucks. That doesn't mean the Army, or the NG even, sucks. It means your unit sucks.
Therefore, the effectiveness of the NG commander is measured by "readiness", such as percentage of MOSQ [unfortunately we moved away from periodic recert of MOSs], personnel strength, etc. In this environment, it is difficult to fire incompetent NCOs, because you have to screw up pretty badly, and sometimes not even then, to get fired.
If you want to go through other measures such as PT or height/weight, you risk having to rid of other effective NCOs. If you want to lateral transfer him to an HQ unit, you have to convince your higher to take the ineffective soldier :)
So the potential is greater for an NG unit to be more ineffective than active units.
A good thing for all of us to remember about people's personal experience. Good or bad, it may not be the norm.
I go back to a fundamental question - if the problem was the implementation where were the resources going to come from to do it right? I don't see how we have the soldiers to occupy Iraq properly and I don't see where they would have come from without a military draft.
We could DOUBLE the size of the Army without a draft and without drastically lowering standards. We just choose not to do so.
It is true that we haven't hit our recruiting targets. The fact is that if it were a priority we would. It would take money, of course, as well as an appeal to the nation. The nation was ready to answer the call on 9/11. Bush urged the nation to go shopping instead.
How could we double the size of the Army without a draft? LOTS OF WAYS.
For one, it is totally insane to pay all soldiers of the same rank the same pay. That isn't how it is done in civilian life. In civilian life attorneys earn more than taxi drivers. Were there a critical need for taxi drivers, pay would go up and the market would react by more people becoming taxi drivers. In the military the jobs that offer the most civilian opportunities after leaving the Army are paid the same as, or more than, the infantry. If we need more infantrymen then pay infantrymen more - not with bonuses, which most people don't know about until they enter service, but straight pay - monthly pay. If the need decreases, decrease their pay. It is the same as a bonus, but a lot more attractive.
Imagine if an infantryman were paid $50K a year right out of high school as a private. The Army would have all the infantry recruits it needs. Sounds crazy? With bonuses a lot of infantrymen are getting more than that already - but bonuses would not be as effective as a general raise in salary. Don't believe me? Look at the effect on retention rates just from tax benefits in a combat zone.
Sound too expensive? A single B-2 stealth bomber is rumored to cost $2 billion dollars. If we paid each soldier $50,000 MORE than we already do, a single B-2 stealth bomber could pay for 40,000 soldiers for an entire year. What would be more useful in Iraq right now, a single B2 overhead armed with JDAMS, or 40,000 more soldiers on the ground?
We have in fact been paying a LOT more than $50K per soldier to increase our forces. A LOT of contractors are performing jobs that used to be done (and still should be done) by soldiers, and they are earning a lot more than $50K. If we were really serious about winning this war we would stop handing chunks of money to Halliburton and hand it to the Army instead - and dedicate it to increasing the size of the force in Iraq, not to weapons programs or Rummy's shoe-shine man or research into how global warming is really good for us. Dedicate $20 billion to the Army and Marines and mandate that it be to increase the size of the troops on the ground in Iraq and could not be spent on anything else. It would happen. If we aren't willing to do that because it is "too expensive" then get the F out NOW because we have already lost. We have already spent about $6.4 billion A MONTH on Iraq. In short, increasing the size of the force is a lot cheaper than not doing so and dragging the war on and one. It is definitely cheaper than losing the war. If we spend approx. $6.4 billion a month already, I am talking about only a little over three months in current spending in Iraq. If it shortens the war by 6 months it will save us billions. If it keeps us from losing it will be priceless. $20 billion would equal $50,000.00 in pay for 400,000 soldiers for a year, or $50,000 for 100,000 soldiers for 4 years. You can't tell me we can't increase the size of the Army without a draft. We just wouldn't want to do so. And a draft is MORE costly than paying soldiers more because it involves involuntary servitude. If we as a republic don't have enough citizen volunteers and we are not willing to pay more to get those volunteers, then we as a republic are unwilling to fight and win the war. That sounds harsh and naive only to those who think it ok for only some citizens to bear the crushing burden of combat. "Sure, Phil can go there and lose a year out of his life and out of his legal career and possibly die or lose a limb, but raise my taxes to pay for victory? No way." I say "way." You have to pay to play, and in a republic we should ALL pay something.
The fact that the Army is not larger than it was on 9/11 is criminal. We need more soldiers, and if we aren't willing to pay for them now we will have to pay more for them later.
The only area where I would quibble with you is in basic pay variances, depending on speciality. The Army already has enough difficulty in retaining folks with those specialities transportable to civilian employment; such a system could exacerbate the problem, esp. if our political leaders in their almighty wisdom chose to fund infantry pay raises out of the pocket of other specialties. It's what they do, isn't it? I prefer bonuses or shortage speciality pay.
Another thing to consider is the proper mix of specialties needed to successfully prosecute COINS warfare. It's by no means all infantry. In fact, leaning too heavily in the direction of infantry will IMO almost certainly doom the endeavor to failure. Recall the Phil Carters of the world? They're needed every bit as much as trigger pullers. So are the guys who're trying to get the infrastructure rebuilt. Objective is to get the hell out of this sink hole, hopefully with a "mission accomplished" banner that actually means something. We don't want to do anything to discourage those who can assist in doing so.
Yes, we need more soldiers. But even more than that, we need political leaders who will level with the American people. And we need citizens who will actually turn off the television and think of what's being done in their name around the world. It might even be that the Army wouldn't have to be expanded and taxes wouldn't need to be increased if the latter would occur.
In my mind none would be more appropriate than George C. Marshall. There are three different bios on him listed at Amazon; by Cray, Uldrich, and Stoler.
Or better yet a bio of a lesser known figure like Lucius D. Clay, military governor of Germany from 1945 to 1949, and a Georgia boy born before the turn of the century who grew up with the lingering problems of Civil War Reconstruction.
Or despite my personal bias against the man, perhaps a book on Douglas MacArthur's role in postwar Japan.
In any case, keep up the good work.
Is my math bad? If we needed 300,000 more troops to occupy Iraq the cost at $50,000 per year is $15 billion dollars per year. And that doesn't count any benefits beyond salary or the cost of equiping and training them. The actual cost is probably at least double that.
While its certainly possible to spend that much, it is an annual cost. So comparisons to B-2's are not really appropriate. We probably don't need any more B-2's for any conceivable purpose short of a war with China or Russia. But that is a different discussion.
My point was that many of the complaints that we didn't do things properly in Iraq are actually complaints that we are there at all. The cost, political or financial, of providing a force of 450,000 troops in Iraq is prohibitive which is why we followed a policy of containment after the Gulf war. If this administration is incompetent, it is not in how it carried out its policies, its in the policy itself. And that is where the lessons are to be learned, not in troop levels or assignments or "tactical" decisions.
Though the book did not enlighten with any new sensational stories, it does one really important thing – it provides people back home with a window to see how life is like in Iraq. The book though is only a few hundred pages long, so it cannot tell everything that happened on the ground. Sad thing, I don’t think people really understand or appreciate the day-in, day-out of being in that type of environment if they never were in that type of environment the first place.
I am unsure if more responsibility needs to be shouldered by the CENTCOM commander to try to also lead a better civil-affairs campaign. At some point, the leader needs to delegate the responsibility to someone who can do the job. That person tapped to do the job needs the resources to carry out the plan, but the political environment of the administration seems to hamper any type cohesive plan with the military police, intelligence, and civil affairs branches. In Iraq, people rotate in and out, and the forces are a lot less than those in WW2 who was doing “constabulary” work. There seems too be little resources to do the job. It also does not help when the private security firms are offering better money to do the same job as those on the ground. To top it off, the general public feels the job in Iraq is strictly for the professional military since that is why they took the job; at some point, society needs to step-in and pitch-out. This is not the GWOT by a few people for the majority back home.
This would then be used to show transformation is not working out as well as it should be.
The paper is titled “The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005”. It provides overviews of 28 different case studies of stability ops during the last 200 years and is worth the read. It was written by Lawrence A. Yates, who recently retired as the chief of the Historical Services Committee of the Combat Studies Institute. The PDF file is online here.
The Foreword mentions the motto of the Combat Studies Institute: "The Past is Prologue", which should warm the cockles of FDChief's heart.
Having read the review and the posts I have some initial comments to make:
First, Packer's book was on my reading list, but I don't think I'll bother with it at this point. Reading Phil's comments it seems that Packer's book has passed its shelf life. No supporter of the war could end a book on the Iraq campaign with a positive view at this point in time, sorry.
Second, having been against this fiasco from the beginning one can only feel a certain sense of vindication in how sorry the whole charade has turned out (carried out by people who in my view have no integrity or credibility). That on one level - on the other, as a veteran and one who is fundamentally sickened at heart by what has been done in our name, the noble name of our country (as JoeAnon has so clearly pointed out at the personal level in Iraq) there is a certain anger and even rage at the continuing travesty, and the abuse of simple language to attempt to justify it. . . enough said.
Third, and returning as is my habit to a strategic theory perspective . . . we need to add some missing elements to the historical equation concerning Germany and the occupation that occurred after the war. For one there was a concerted effort during the war to use and "re-educate" certain German POW's (the author Alfred Andersch comes to mind) in rebuilding Germany using Germans once the war was finished. This is well-known in Germany and there have been various documentary interviews with former German POW's and how they were introduced to American culture, music, literature and the effect it had on them. "Taking initiative" and "responsibility" at a whole variety of levels, is cultural. In the 1920's there was a strong strain of this in Germany, and we must remember that Germany had been a quasi-democracy after Bismarck and a full democracy between 1918-33, so it is not like the US/UK/Fr were starting from scratch. . .
In this regard I think the greatest distinction between Germany 1946 and Iraq 2004 is that we did not intend to make Germany a colony in 1946, but given the radical nature of our (unstated) war aims for Iraq, that is/was very much the goal of US policy in the Middle East under Bush II. . .
Finally, the greatest problem we had (notice this is in the past tense) in establishing this "empire" was that we didn't possess the mentality to found or maintain an empire, unlike what the British, French or even Germans had a century ago. There was no mood to devote one's self to the goal of getting down and dirty with the natives and making the empire "work", that is convincing them by carrot and stick that they were better off as servants of the empire. Instead we attempted to swindle them with promises of "democracy" which are so obviously flawed. Every Iraqi knows that the "democratic" model currently on the table is one that we originally rejected, is rather that of Iman Sistani, and that our goal was establishing a new strongman who would do our bidding (Saddam with without the facial hair). . . we are imo caught between the sham goals that Bush presents the American public (our false set of war aims) and the very real reality on the ground in Iraq which is the result of our botched attempt at dominating the Iraqi state and remaking the Iraqi political identity. . .
multipy the Israeli experience in the West Bank 10x . . .
It's just dumb. You can't make up for clueless stupidity and malicious corruption with more troops. Would you wipe your ass with a hand grenade? This is a mission for toilet paper.
Then, Mike notes that it might be good idea to learn a little about those who dealt with these issues before. Right on, Mike. William Manchester's "American Caesar" is a good treatment of Douglas MacArthur. For a good take on MacArthur and some facets of the Japanese occupation, check out Jim Webb's (yes, the same Jim Webb who was in the Reagan Administration and is now running as a Democrat for a Senate seat from Virginia), "The Emperor's General," published in 1997. It's a novel and a great read, but it's meticulously researched and you won't find anything in there that isn't substantiated by history. MacArthur saved Japan. He is still remembered in Japan, fondly and not so fondly.
By all means read about George Marshall, probably the greatest general of them all. Also check out Eisenhower's "Crusade in Europe." Turgid and way long, but it tells the tale up to the occupation.
I've never been able to find a biography of Lucius Clay, which is a pity, because he's one of those folks whom we really should remember. He was a logistician and was close to Eisenhower, who tabbed him to rescue the dismal supply situation in France following D-Day. Clay saved the day. Then he became Eisenhower's deputy military governor in Germany, moving up after Eisenhower left. He worked a miracle running the occupation. He conceptualized and ran the Berlin Airlift and is still venerated by older Berliners, who placed a stone on his grave at West Point that reads: "We thank the Defender of our Freedom."
I wonder if Iraqis will still be talking about any U.S. "liberators" 50+ years from now?
Seydlitz, I really liked your most recent post. Excellent insight.
Packer book is still relevant and it will be in decade because it tells the tale of how this war was made, the race to Baghdad. The authors empathy with the cause and with many of the actors in it makes for a fine book with few outright villains or fools.
There's a telling incident in the book were the AEI and the CSIS are asked by Wolfowitz to produce a post-invasion plan. The neocon AEI protest that we don't do nation building and Wolfowitz takes it no further. Packer rightly sees this as a fatal flaw: a very risky state building enterprise being lead by men who thought regime change would reshape Iraqi society in an instant.
I have an old copy of Manchester's bio of MacArthur but have never been able to wade through its 960 pages. Not that it isn't well written, my antipathy is probably due to Great Uncle Dinty's stories of the Bonus Army. However, on your recommendation I have just ordered James Webb's "The Emperor's General" (how can I resist any work by the author of "Fields of Fire").
FYI - found and ordered a bio of Clay titled "Lucius D. Clay - An American Life" by Jean Edward Smith who also wrote a bio of Grant. It had a five star customer rating but alas only one customer reviewer.
I was going to opt out on Packer's book based on a few of the above comments on shelf life but went ahead and ordered a copy because of Phil's good review and Ali's comment. Ten years from now it should be interesting for Phil to do another review of this text.
Has anyone else had the alarming sensation of being completely out of sorts? No weapon. No IEDs. All those months of guys getting blown up in front of me, the firefights, the screaming and the gaggles of Iraqis, all the good and the bad of it, and now, silence.
The blessed hush of REMFs debating in whisper how many guest soaps they need to put in the very hot showers.
I've never felt more alienated in my life. One actually gets panic attacks when the rifle isn't there, when there isn't that slow ache and tug of the armor. It's so disconcerting. Dangling man.
I now know what Capt Carter felt when he went on leave. Now I worry that it's all going to make me soft and I'll get capped my first day back outside the wire. Some R&R!
JD, I'm becoming verily concerned with the lowering of standards in order to prop up the number (paucity!) that we have. I never thought I'd encounter the ranks of criminals, high school dropouts and general neer-do-well jahoshes with whom I've served OIF IV. The stories, while each tragic, boil down to one theme: Waiver.
In our quest to raise troops levels, we have provided soldiers with more (tax free!) money than we've ever earned before (although I'm still taking a soaking compared to my civilian job). Some FOBs (or are they COBs?) resemble malls more than they do military installations, and the overwhelming concern for "force protection" means a disproportionate amount of the fighting falls on SOBs like me.
These policies that were intended to boost the ranks in the field have, IMO, created a force structure that actually impedes what we need to do outside the wire. I'm not a logistical expert by any stretch of the imagination, but I can't imagine how much of the materiel trucked, shipped and flown into these rear echelons actually is necessary to the war effort.
In the bush, we seem to get along with a lot of 5.56mm, det line, batteries and bottled Saudi water. Do all these souls -- and, most importantly, their even larger ranks of contractors -- need Burger King, Green Beanery and jewelry stores?
Please disregard my own hypocrisy here; I most willingly guzzled a hazlenut latte at said Green Beanery this morning, and it was delicious. But, still, no blood for cappuchinno!
Would these legions of the rear necessarily bolt en masse if more were turned into frontline units? Why are we keeping two armored brigades in Kuwait, constantly training, when we've had so many casualties in the frontlines of Anbar? Is this for domestic consumption, as a means to suggest that we're winning the war and don't need them?
I say this because sometimes I believe our arguments bog down when we wistfully recall the headier days of the pre-invasion, when generals actually discussed such notions as troop numbers, length of occupation, et al. Obviously, BOTH civilian and military leaders made grievous errors in strategic AND tactical decisions on the eve of the war, and many of these gaffes have been compounded by the wages of time.
But what about the hopelessly callow mistakes we're still making? Some, as joeanonymous suggests, perhaps stem from a legacy of low accountability, poor equipping and training, and a dearth of realworld standards for our National Guard and Reserve forces.
Other problems, I think he's suggesting -- a point with which I agree -- derive from a failure of our military and civilian leadership to mitigate the inherent risk of our professional Army and Marine Corps being "ground down" by endless rounds of deployments in a war that's seemingly less and less "winnable" (whatever the definition we wish to employ there).
A buddy in the IAs and I joust on this very position. My contention is that the invasion of Iraq has been very good for him, his family and the vast majority of his countrymen.
But it's been terrible for our shrinking infantry and armored forces. The loss in equipment is one thing. But what about the intangibles for which few metrics exist to chart?
The well-documented abuses by our NCO and Officer leadership of detainees is abhorrent to the professional soldier, yet these continue, seemingly unabated, and are becoming a cancer in our ranks. Many of my colleagues make light of Abu Ghraid (and the many smaller and larger but less photographed Abu Ghraids that have happened throughout the war); I say that the very fact that they seek to explain away war crimes is a telling diagnosis of a more systemic problem.
Even if we make all of our recruitment quotas, what of the institutional damage this war has wrought on our ground forces? Will we have another "hollow Army" that we stomached during the 1970s? Will we have another painful rebuilding effort, this time alongside a technological transformation of the brigades?
And what of the most nettlesome issue of fewer and fewer citizens willing to fight our battles? Even if the economy were in the doldrums, how many teens and young adults seriously would contemplate serving their nation? Are we constrained to "buying" their services rather than making these sacrifices a condition of citizenship? What of the contractors? Are we at a point when mercenaries are so in vogue that we take on hired hands to combat enemies of our state?
Do you know what wags in the line call KBR? "Keeping Bush Rich." I think that's grossly unfair to the men and women of KBR and other contractors, but it's a spreading
sentiment. I hardly imagine we'll see our Verdun-bound poilus turn their cannons on the munitions plants to their rear in protest of the war machine, but many soldiers of junior rank have started questioning exactly why we're here.
I happen to believe there's a brutal nobility to this cause, but I'm something of a Third Worlder. They're not. They deserve to have a better explanation why they're asked to give their lives to Mesopotamia.
I'm reaching a point in my life when I don't want to go on neverending patrols. I want children. My wife would like to see me, every so often, back in Burberry and not ACUs. We GenXers have fought enough (Desert Storm/Shield, Operation Restore Hope, Kosovo, Bosnia, OIF I-IV); it's time for us to return to our prudent Penelopes and be done with killing.
What sort of military have our Boomer bosses -- you know, the generation that fought in Vietnam and swore that they would never wage such a war again -- left us in 2006?
Is it more like the Army we saw in 1996? Or 1976?
It certainly isn't the one from 1776.
Now I'm depressed as hell.
growing gang activity in US army
gangs
Why not add my own two bits after Carl's great post. . . I think most of my generation avoided military service if we take the generation as a whole. Not only those who came of age during Vietnam but especially those afterwards. Few of those my age (DOB 1957) have served and we constitute the peak of the Baby Boom, more native-born Americans having been born in 1957 than any year before or since. . .
Going through Camp Pendleton's Separations Barracks in the fall of 1975 was for me an eye-opening experience. I remember as a young Pvt, fresh out of boot camp and FST school having to deal with "hobos" sleeping underneath one of the barracks that we had to police and they throwing trash out for us to pick up, after we had passed, of course. "Ignore them and just clean up the mess" was the word, since they were all awaiting their "Big Chicken Dinners" in any case. . .
It was at that point when I realized exactly how much we had lost in the Vietnam War. There was no question of fielding an operational level force (Battalion or above) since half of the troops would have bolted given the order to deploy. Those hobos camped out under the barracks were only the worst of the lot, the marginal had in fact been retained, as I had seen serving in a firing battery. Talking about the Marine Corps in 1975 here, not the Army, which probably would have been even worse given its size. . .
I've always wondered about those revisionist views that have the US going back into Vietnam and really cleaning the NVA's clocks in operational-sized engagements during 1974-76. . . a pipedream, imo, sadly.
Carl is talking about the bosses of course, not the generation as a whole. Just thought that I would add a bit more background.
As to the bosses, far too many "politicals", imo, those who saw their future in using/abusing the system to their own ends. I've had Army and AF Majors plot their whole careers for me in the mid-80's. "Retire, but first get a job in the Pentagon in weapons procurement as my last tour. After retirement work as a consultant for the main corporate supplier of my last posting and make the really big money. There is a limit here since one is only marketable as long as one has contacts on the inside." That has been a general attitude for over 20 years in all the services. The rot is deep imo, "systemic" as Carl mentions. . . Not that I am saying anything surprising to most of those here.
And we are not even addressing the confusions, contradictions from a strategic theory perspective. . . war as a continuation of policy by a specific regime with specific goals . . .
To all: Peace.
The History winner in '05? The far-superior-to-1776 Washington's Crossing, by David Hackett Fischer, about pretty much the same events. So no politics that I can discern in the Pulitzers.
Could you be more explicit on why the Army needs to be larger than what it was on 9/11? Are you sure having a larger Army is a key to defending America? What would you have all of these additional soldiers doing, especially if we had not made the decision to invade Iraq?
Calling for a larger Army at least appears akin to responding to 9/11 by acting in ways consistent not with the new threat but with the old threats such as those posed by the Soviet Union.
Some argue that the its not the Army that should be bigger but perhaps the Coast Guard. See, e.g, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0504/dailyUpdate.html
If you were able to double the size of the Army, what would you being doing with those soliders.
Furthermore, I am skeptical that doubling the size of the Army is a simple matter of adjusting how we pay soldiers. Do you have actual evidence to back the claim that it would be so easy to double the Army by adjusting pay? Your cost calculations dont appear to include the fact that it would not be politically feasible to change pay just for new recruits without changing pay for all soldiers nor do they appear to include the cost of ensuring all of the benefits beyond direct pay such as healthcare for soldiers and their families.
Is pay really the problem? Are you asserting the pay system is currently broken? Since you indicate standards are not to be lowered, how many qualified recruits have money as their primary factor to decide whether or not to join the military? Are you sure that other issues such as what it means to commit to military service and the chances you are going to be sent to a war might not be a lot bigger factors. Where are all of these new highly qualified soldiers going to come from?
A bigger Army isnt necessarily a better Army in light of our new threats nor is doubling the size simply a matter of adjusting pay a little here and there.
let you know how he sees the prospects now (not good):
NewYorkerPacker
"The idea is that Iraq, which an Iraqi official recently described as “a country near death,” will somehow begin to consolidate around the government of Prime Minister Maliki, and the violence will somehow begin to subside. As a strategy, this amounts to muddling through the rest of the Bush Presidency, without being forced to admit defeat, until January of 2009, when the war will become a new President’s problem."
Good points. It is true that if we had not gone to war we would not need a larger Army. But, Catch22, we did, and we should do what it takes to win it as quickly and cheaply as possible. I am not advocating enlarging the Army for the sake of having a larger Army. I am advocating having a larger Army in order to accomplish the mission the nation assigned to the Army.
Does adjusting pay affect recruitment? Our experience with the all-volunteer forces shows that it does. I am not advocating increasing the pay just for new recruits - PFCs should not make more than SFCs. I am advocating more pay not based on rank, but on the needs of the Army. We already do that to some extent - jump pay and flight pay, for instance. I suggest more of that because it is effective and it is much cheaper and better than a draft of citizens against their will. And I disagree that pay for all soldiers would need to be raised. A file clerk won't see a pay raise unless more file clerks are needed. If we don't need more file clerks, there is no need to raise their pay. It would be politically feasible because most people would understand that an infantryman in Fallujah is risking more than the file clerk in Omaha, and it would be only fair to pay the rifleman more - or the mechanic, or the cook, or the truck driver, or whatever job we have a shortage in and need to recruit more of.
Is the pay system broken? Well, yes, but not because of the rate of pay, just because the system is broken - pay gets messed up all the time. Talk to any soldier who has spent time in the Army and he has, or somebody in his platoon has, seen pay problems. I wasn't paid once for six months due to such a problem. But that isn't my point. We can use money to attract more soldiers. That doesn't make them mercenaries any more than surgeons are mercenaries. If money is their prime motivation for enlisting, fine, as long as they perform well. Our primary and most effective recruiting tool is the GI Bill. We pay for college. Many soldiers, including myself, enlist for the GI Bill. It was not my only motivating factor. Patriotism and a desire to serve my nation was also a factor. But in my heart I know I would not have enlisted at the age of 17 if it were not for the GI Bill. I found I loved the Army and stayed on, but the most effective tool for getting me to join the Army was the GI Bill. That is cash for my service, and it did not make me a mercenary. Without it, though, I would not have enlisted. We can use incentives, including cold hard cash with no spending restrictions like the GI bill, to attract more qualified recruits.
You are right that it is not "simply a matter of adjusting pay a little here and there." I agree. But adjusting pay, not a little but a LOT, would be one way to increase the size of the force. Not the only way, but an effective way. Combined with other ideas, we can increase the size of the force with qualified volunteers. The Bush Administration just doesn't want to do it. They would rather spend the money on useless weapons systems that make money for their political allies in the defense industry. More Joes in the Army won't do that, so the administration doesn't support it. They don't care about victory or about the Army.
You say "A bigger Army isnt necessarily a better Army." I agree.
are only about 30% of the budget. So sure, the cost of
hiring more people isn't too bad: but then you have to train
them and equip them. And since the cost of operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan has been funded off-budget by
supplemental "emergency" appropriations, it's a fair guess
that putting anthor 130K troops into Iraq would in fact cost
at least another $80B/year. I have a strong suspicion that
even those huge costs are an underestimate, because all the
expensive heavy equipment - tanks, Bradleys, Humvees etc -
which were designed for a month-long war in Germany are now
badly in need of a major overhaul after 2-3 years of
heavy use in desert conditions. That's going to be more
tens of billions for which the bill will show up probably
only after Rumsfeld leaves the Pentagon.
For myself, I think we've got this all back to front: the
US is spending more on the military than the rest of the
world put together. And yet we're less secure than at
any time since 1962 - North Korea and Pakistan have gone
nuclear, Al Qaida is still out there, and most major
allies are alienated. This is not a military problem:
continuing to bash a screw with larger and larger hammers
is just going to make a bigger mess.
JD - The GI Bill was one of my primary reasons for enlistment also. Best thing that ever happened in my professional life was the privilege of a GI Bill Education. I have heard some horror stories lately though. What is the current status of the GI Bill for today's enlistees?
I am greatly saddened by what this imperial farrago in Iraq is doing to the Army I loved. The sad fact is that it is becoming clear that the choice is now between being a good soldier and being a good American. If we continue along the march to empire the day will come when American soldiers will have to choose what their oath of enlistment means - are we the country of Washington, or the country of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney..?
What?
JD, war is never cheap, and winning a war cannot be done on the cheap. Ever.
(My sources: two thousand years of recorded military history)
Iraq being a current example (and albatross).
Also, I'm in disagreement to Catch22, but with caveats attached. When the decision to go to war (read: Seeking a pretext and having it handed to you, no matter how remote the connections are) it behooves the war planners to increase the size of the military.
The assumption Catch22 is working from is that we, the US as a whole, were reacting to an event, 9/11, and not from a predisposition for seizing a pretext for war. Thus, from Catch22's pov, yes, it makes no sense to enlarge an army, but if one is looking to start a war...
"I wanted to be in the Continental Line, not the X Legio Fretensis..."
Better the X Fretensis than the IX Hispana, and considering the Continental Army (Unless you meant the "Ships of the Line") and how those wars were conducted the fate of the IX looks even better.
But I digress.
My apologies.
I think the retention rate of the military has less to do with money, and more to do with competence of, combined with faith in the leadership. This would be both officers and elected officials.
Elected officials can be voted out, and thus that situation is self-correcting (one would hope), but for the military, elections are not held for leadership (which for discipline sake is a good thing). Though I'm sure there is a greater majority of good officers (ie, statisically improbable that they're all bad, and hopefull those who are are in the minority), there is also a population of officers who are ill fit to lead a janitorial brigade mucking out an overused horse stable.
I'm sure there are combinations of factors of which this is one small bias observation, but it happens to be the one I encounter frequently when talking to ex-military.
Of course war isn't cheap. However, some options are cheaper than others, and military officers know very well that limited resources must be utilized in the most efficient way possible. Please don't twist my words to mean something I never said. I say again, we should win this war as cheaply, and as quickly, as we can. That does not mean it will be cheap - it has already cost a great deal in both blood and treasure - nor quick.
Retention in the Army appears to be at record levels, a testament to just how impressive the leadership at the grunt level and above truly is. It may be a problem in the future, but that will be due more to bungling at the highest (read: Bush and Rummy) levels, not due to ineffective "green-tab" leadership. The issue we confront now is not retention, it is the initial recruitment of new soldiers. Big difference in those two issues.
Military officers serve at the pleasure of the president. If there are incompetent officers it is easier to replace them than it is to replace incompetent, arrogant, dim-witted, ideological, possibly insane elected officia